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WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO FIX THE EMPLOYEE/





America's ever changing economy and workforce have strained the
classic employer/employee relationship. Businesses are having to adapt
quickly to fluctuating work force needs, rapidly changing technologies,
hiring freezes, and escalating administrative costs. Consequently, em-
ployers are increasingly hiring independent contractors for project and
specialty work in lieu of the traditional long-term employee. Moreover,
an expanding worker pool is seeking (or is willing to accept) independent
contractor relationships that will provide part-time work to women with
children, the elderly, moonlighters, and people on temporary layoff.'
Unfortunately, this trend toward using independent contractors (as
opposed to employees) is escalating a tax problem which the income tax
system is ill equipped to handle. Under the U.S. income tax system, any-
one who provides services to another is classified as either an "employee"
or "independent contractor."2 There are no other classifications. The
income tax consequences flowing from proper classification (to both the
worker and the service recipient) are frequently substantial.3 Likewise,
the tax penalties for a misclassified worker can be devastating to all in-
volved parties.4
The rules for determining proper worker classification date back to
1935 and represent a hodgepodge of requirements set forth by Congress,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts.5 The present worker clas-
sification rules are simply inadequate. Informed observers have de-
* Associate Professor, North Carolina Central University. B.S., 1975 Florida State Univer-
sity; J.D., 1981 University of North Carolina; LL.M., 1985 University of Florida.
1. For a thoughtful discussion of the increased use of independent contractors in the business
community, see Dan R. Mastromarco, The Rekindling Independent Contractor Debate, 53 TAX
NOTES 601 (1991).
2. See infra notes 110 - 124 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 12 - 70 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 81 - 109 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 110 - 144 and accompanying text.
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scribed the rules as "radically confusing,"6 as "placing in the hands of
the [Internal Revenue Service] unacceptably wide discretion," 7 and "as
broken and cannot be fixed with only minor changes."' Supreme Court
Justice Scalia concluded that the rules have resulted in "venerable
confusion." 9
Congress desperately needs to overhaul the current worker classifica-
tion rules, but this is by no means an easy task. Because taxpayers, their
advisors, and Government have competing interests, there is little con-
sensus as to exactly how the rules "should" work. There is no shortage
of proposals, however. Business groups, professional groups, and com-
mentators have flooded Congress with recommendations. 1 It is, of
course, ultimately up to Congress to fashion the most workable and equi-
table compromise of these various proposals.
This article does not attempt to offer a "best" set of rules - that has
been attempted elsewhere."l Instead, this article: (i) strives to clarify the
issues and problems by providing a rather detailed roadmap through the
maze of current worker classification rules, (ii) categorizes and highlights
key elements of recent proposals offered to Congress, and (iii) offers a set
of general guidelines and principles Congress should consider in its effort
to improve worker classification rules. Finally, this article joins a chorus
of voices urging Congress to enact long overdue legislation that will ad-
dress the problems created by the present worker classification rules.
Although worker classification rules may have a direct impact on state
and local income tax withholding, state unemployment levies, worker's
compensation issues, Fair Labor Standards Act, Minimum Wage Act,
etc., this article is limited to the "federal" income and employment tax
rules.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A PROPERLY CLASSIFIED WORKER
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) is convinced that an
increasing number of employees are being misclassified as independent
contractors. In 1984, the IRS estimated that the Government lost at
least $1.6 billion in tax revenues due to worker misclassification. 2 In
1987, the IRS began a pilot program entitled Employment Tax Examina-
6. From statements made by Representative Douglas Barnard, Democrat from Georgia, to the
House Small Business Subcommittee on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special Problems on July 30, 1991.
10 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at 915 (Aug. 5, 1991).
7. Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 606.
8. Robert K. Johnson and Stephen D. Rose, Legislative Proposal On Classification of Workers
As Employees Or Independent Contractors, 55 TAX NOTES 821 (1992).
9. Ellin Rosenthal, High Court Considers Independent Contractor Issue, 54 TAx NOTES 415
(1992).
10. See infra notes 167 - 179 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Mastromarco, supra note 1; Johnson and Rose, supra note 8.
12. See Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 607.
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tion Program (ETEP) which dramatically increased the number of audits
against employers (Employers) that use independent contractors.' 3 Ac-
cording to the Commissioner's Annual Report, ETEP reclassified 77,000
workers in 1989 and imposed $94 million in additional taxes and penal-
ties.' 4 Taxpayers and practitioners are both voicing loud objections to
the increased audit pressure and are pleading for Congressional relief.'5
Why are workers and the taxpayers to whom the workers are provid-
ing services (Service Recipients) so outraged by the worker classification
rules? This can be answered only if one is first familiar with the tax
consequences flowing from a properly classified employee (Employee) as
contrasted with a properly classified independent contractor (IC).
Tax Consequences of Employee Status
A properly classified Employee imposes upon the Service Recipient (in
this case the Employer) a lengthy laundry list of tax responsibilities. For
instance, the Employer must report each Employee's wages to the IRS
on Form W-2 as well as other wage information on Form 941 (the quar-
terly payroll return). 6 More significantly, on behalf of each Employee,
the Employer must withhold federal income taxes17 and social security
(FICA) taxes.' 8 The Employer must also pay federal unemployment
(FUTA) tax on behalf of the Employee.' °
Furthermore, an Employer's obligation to its Employees many times
runs well beyond the mere reporting of wages and withholding of taxes.
For instance, the tax system allows an Employer to offer tax-favored
fringe benefits to its Employees (but only to its Employees). For example,
an Employer can provide its Employees with a tax-favored qualified re-
tirement plan,20 group-term life insurance,2' an accident and health
13. Id. at 603.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 167 - 179 and accompanying text.
16. See Daniel L. Morgan and Yale F. Goldberg, Employees and Independent Contractors,
Tax Transactions Libr. (CCH), 73 (June, 1990).
17. I.R.C. § 3402 (1992).
18. See I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1992). The Employer is required to withhold a stated percentage
of the Employee's wages for Social Security Taxes. The current rate is 7.65% of the first $57,600 of
wages for 1993 ($55,500 for 1992). The 7.65% tax rate is actually made up of two separate taxes: (i)
the old age, survivors, and disability insurance tax (OASDI) is presently 6.2% (§ 3101 (a)); and (ii)
the hospital insurance tax (HI) is currently 1.45% (§ 3101 (b)). The HI wage base is $135,000 for
1993 ($130,200 for 1992). These wage bases are adjusted annually for cost of living. Furthermore,
the Employer is required to pay additional Social Security Taxes of 7.65% on the same wage base
previously described. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a),(b) (1992). This creates an effective social security tax rate
of 15.3% on the Employee's wage base.
19. See I.R.C. § 3301-3311 (1992).
20. See I.R.C. §§ 401 et. seq. (1992).
21. See I.R.C. § 79 (1992).
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plan,22 meals and lodging,23 group legal services,24 dependent child
25262care, educational assistance,26 Employee discounts,27 and various other
Employee fringes.28
The above-listed Employee fringe benefits are tax-favored because the
Employer is allowed to deduct the fringe benefit payment while the Em-
ployee can exclude the fringe benefit from taxable income. However,
subject to limited exceptions, 29 an Employer must satisfy rigid nondis-
crimination rules in order to qualify the fringe benefit for tax-favored
treatment.30 This generally means that the Employer must offer the
fringe benefit to a broad range of Employees, and may not limit it pri-
marily to highly-compensated Employees. Critically important, the
fringe benefit nondiscrimination rules are applied to all actual and
"deemed" Employees.3' Consequently, a worker who is reclassified from
IC status to Employee status will impose not only tax reporting and
withholding obligations upon the Employer, but may violate the nondis-
crimination requirements of the Employer's tax-favored fringe benefit
plans.
Tax Consequences of Independent Contractor (IC) Status
A Service Recipient who hires an IC has significantly less tax responsi-
bilities than one hiring an Employee. A Service Recipient is not respon-
sible for withholding any employment-related taxes for the IC. Nor is
the Service Recipient required to include the IC in any of its Employee
22. See I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106 (1992).
23. See I.R.C. § 119 (1992).
24. See I.R.C. § 120 (1992). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 120(e), this provision terminated for taxable
years beginning after June 30, 1992.
25. See I.R.C. § 129 (1992).
26. See I.R.C. § 127 (1992). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 127(d), this provision terminated for taxable
years beginning after June 30, 1992.
27. See I.R.C. § 132(c) (1992).
28. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 132(d) (granting tax-favored status to working condition fringe benefits),
132(b) (granting tax-favored status to no-additional-cost services), and 132(e) (granting tax-favored
status to qualified transportation fringe benefits).
29. There are no discrimination rules applicable to accident and health plans providing benefits
pursuant to a licensed insurance company. However, employer-provided self insured medical reim-
bursement plans are subject to employee nondiscrimination requirements. See I.R.C. § 105(h)
(1992). Furthermore, there are no discrimination rules for working condition fringes or de minimis
fringes under section 132. See I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (1992).
30. For example, the following tax-favored fringe benefits carry nondiscrimination require-
ments: qualified retirement plan benefits (See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(26), 410(b), and 414(q) (1992));
group term life insurance (See I.R.C. § 79(d) (1992)); self-insured medical reimbursement plans (See
I.R.C. § 105(h) (1992)); group legal services (See I.R.C. § 120(c)(1) (1992)); dependent care (See
I.R.C. § 129(d)(2) (1992)); educational assistance programs (See I.R.C. § 127(b)(2) (1992)); no-addi-
tional-cost services and qualified employee discounts (See I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (1992); and cafeteria
plans (See I.R.C. § 125(b)(2) (1992)).
31. Id. None of the nondiscrimination statutes contains a provision that would exclude re-
classified workers.
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fringe benefit plans. The Service Recipient can satisfy its only filing re-
quirement by filing Form 1099 (an information return) with the IRS,32
which merely reports the amount of compensation paid to the IC. Conse-
quently, the IC status of a worker reduces substantially the administra-
tive tax burden otherwise imposed upon an Employer. Instead, the tax
reporting and payment burden is largely shifted to the IC.
Unlike an Employee, an IC has a litany of tax responsibilities and con-
sequences. The IC is required to remit her own estimated income taxes
to the IRS on a quarterly basis. 3 The IC is also responsible for paying
her own Self-Employment Contribution Act (SECA) taxes on her net
self-employment income.34 The IC's SECA tax is the complement to
(and is computed in a manner very similar to) an Employee's FICA
taxes. The IC's SECA tax approximates the amount of the Employer's
and Employee's share of an Employee's FICA tax. 5 Moreover, an IC
can deduct one half of the SECA tax for purposes of computing her ad-
justed gross income.36 This deduction is designed to complement the
rule that allows an Employee to exclude the Employer's portion of FICA
taxes from gross income. The IC pays no FUTA tax.37
Although an IC has more onerous tax reporting and payment obliga-
tions than an Employee, an IC is also entitled to certain substantive tax
benefits not available to an Employee. For example, in 1986 Congress
enacted Section 67 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code")
which allows deductions for "miscellaneous itemized deductions" only to
the extent such aggregate expenses exceed 2 percent of a taxpayer's ad-
justed gross income.18 An Employee's unreimbursed business expense is
a classic miscellaneous itemized deduction.39 Consequently, most Em-
ployees' business deductions are significantly reduced or eliminated alto-
gether under the 2 percent floor of Section 67. By contrast, an IC's
business expense is not a miscellaneous itemized deduction and is there-
fore not limited by Section 67.1° The IC also has a potential tax advan-
tage over the Employee with regard to the so-called home office
deduction. Taxpayers who maintain an office in the home may be enti-
32. See I.R.C. § 6041 (1992).
33. See I.R.C. § 6654(c) (1992).
34. See I.R.C. §§ 1401 et. seq. (1992)
35. As discussed in note 18, supra, Social Security taxes are generally paid at an effective rate of
15.3% on the Employee's wage base. Likewise, an IC is required to pay Self-Employment Contribu-
tion Act (SECA) Taxes on his net self-employment income at an effective rate of 15.3% on the same
net self-employment income base as applied to an Employee. See I.R.C. § 1402 (1992).
36. I.R.C. §§ 164(f), 1402(a)(12) (1992).
37. I.R.C. §§ 3301, 3306(a) (1992) (which impose FUTA taxes only upon "Employers").
38. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1992).
39. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 63(d),and 67(b) (1992).
40. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) generally provides that trade or business expenses of a nonemployee (e.g.,
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tled to deduct depreciation, repair and maintenance, utilities, and insur-
ance allocable to the home office.4" Moreover, a valid home office may
allow a taxpayer to deduct certain travel expenses that would otherwise
be nondeductible commuting expenses,4 2 and would also expand the de-
duction for home office computers.43 However, since a home is an inher-
ently personal (nondeductible) asset, Congress has placed severe
statutory limitations on the availability of home office deductions. More
specifically, in most situations, Section 280A allows home office deduc-
tions to an IC only if the home office is used regularly and on an exclu-
sive basis as the IC's "principal place of business.""
The Supreme Court recently adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation
of the phrase "principal place of business" which will, in all likelihood,
significantly restrict the availability of the home office deduction for
many taxpayers.45 However, regardless of how principal place of busi-
ness is defined, it is much easier for an IC to qualify for a home office
deduction than an Employee. This is because Section 280A imposes ad-
ditional requirements upon Employees. More specifically, an Employee
can take home office deductions only if the home office is her principal
place of business and is "for the convenience of her Employer."46 For
most Employees, it is very difficult to establish that a home office is for
the convenience of their Employer.47 By contrast, the IC is not saddled
41. Generally, a taxpayer must satisfy the rigid requirements of I.R.C. 280A in order to take
home office deductions.
42. Treasury Regulations §§ 1.162-2(e) and 1.262-1(b)(5) expressly provide that commuting
costs from a taxpayer's residence to his place of business are not deductible trade or business ex-
penses. However, in Revenue Ruling 90-23, the IRS has ruled that travel costs from a taxpayer's
residence to a "temporary work location" are deductible trade or business expenses. Rev. Rul. 90-23,
1990-1 C.B. 23. A "temporary work location" is any work location (other than the taxpayer's "reg-
ular place of business") where the taxpayer performs services on an irregular or short-term basis.
Consequently, it would seem logical that a taxpayer who can establish a valid home office under
I.R.C. § 280A would have a much stronger argument that his business travel away from the home
office was not a nondeductible commute.
43. I.R.C. § 280F places severe limitations on the amount and timing of deductions for home
computers used for business purposes. However, these restrictions do not apply to a home computer
used in a taxpayer's home office that satisfies the requirements of section 280A(c)(1). I.R.C.
§ 280F(d)(4)(B) (1992).
44. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1992).
45. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed
a Fourth Circuit decision whereby the court of appeals adopted a liberal facts and circumstances test
for determining whether the home office was a taxpayer's "principal place of business." In reversing
the appeals court decision, the Supreme Court suggested that the home office must be the most
important and significant place of business, and that the time spent at each work location should be
given primary consideration. Id.
46. I.R.C. § 280A(c) (1992).
47. The IRS generally takes the position that it is virtually impossible for an employee who is
supplied an office at work to establish that her home office is "for the convenience of the employer."
For example, in Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), the Government argued
that the "convenience of employer" test was failed where a college professor was supplied only a
shared office at the library of the college.
6
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with this "convenience of employer" requirement.
Moreover, there are other deductions available to an IC that are un-
available to an Employee. For example, historically48 an IC could de-
duct 25 percent of his health insurance premiums as an unrestricted
"above-the-line" deduction49 while the Employee must treat the entire
payment as a potentially restricted "itemized deduction."5 ° Moreover,
an IC can fully deduct interest incurred in her trade or business,5" while
an Employee's trade or business interest is not deductible at all.5 2 For
example, if an IC borrows money to buy a truck to use exclusively in her
business, the interest on the loan would be fully deductible. By contrast,
interest on the same loan to buy the same truck for use in an Employee's
trade or business would not be deductible at all.
Finally, each expense allowed to an IC that is unavailable to an Em-
ployee serves to create other indirect tax savings to an IC. This indirect
tax savings occurs because many deductions otherwise allowed to tax-
payers are reduced as the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds cer-
tain levels. Consequently, each expense allowed to an IC (that is
unavailable to an Employee) reduces the IC's adjusted gross income
which, in turn, may increase the amount of other deductible items. For
example, a taxpayer's personal exemptions and dependency deductions
are scaled back as his adjusted gross income exceeds certain levels. 3
Thus, IC deductions that reduce the IC's adjusted gross income may also
serve to preserve the deductibility of his personal exemptions and depen-
dency deductions.
Observation
Based on the foregoing, it should be clear that in many respects the
substantive tax rules that apply to ICs are far different from those apply-
ing to Employees. One might intuitively assume (as some have)54 that
the overall tax rules favor IC status over Employee status. Based on the
Service's massive attempt to reclassify ICs as Employees, it would appear
that the Government believes this to be true. However, closer analysis
reveals that the IC tax rules are probably not inherently more pro tax-
payer than the Employee tax rules.
48. Under I.R.C. § 162(l)(6), this deduction expired for taxable years beginning after June 30,
1992.
49. I.R.C. § 162(1) (1992).
50. See I.R.C. §§ 162(l), 213(d)(1)(C) (1992).
51. I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(2)(A) (1992).
52. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1992).
53. For example, on a joint return, each personal exemption is reduced by 2 percentage points
for each $2,500 (or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $162,700
for 1993 ($157,900 for 1992). I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (1992). The threshold is increased annually for
inflation. I.R.C. § 151(d)(4) (1992).
54. See Subotnik, infra note 72.
1992]
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It is true that ICs are allowed many deductions unavailable to Em-
ployees.55 However, Employees are granted a long list of tax-favored
fringe benefits that are generally unavailable to ICs.56 One commentator
recently estimated that tax-free fringe benefits represent about 17 percent
of the average Employee's compensation package. 57 Moreover, many of
the deductions that are technically allowed to an IC (and not to an Em-
ployee) are more apparent than real. For example, an IC's business ex-
penses are not subject to the 2 percent miscellaneous itemized deduction
limitation. However, an Employee's business expense that is reimbursed
under an Employer's "accountable plan" also avoids this 2 percent limi-
tation.58 In all likelihood, most legitimate Employee business expenses
are reimbursed under an accountable plan. 59 Consequently, in actuality
most Employee business expenses are probably not limited under the 2
percent rule.
With regard to the home office deduction, it is easier for an IC to qual-
ify than an Employee. However, the rules that do apply to ICs are re-
strictive enough to deny home office deductions to many ICs.' Even if
an IC does qualify, the home office expenses are frequently de minimis
because they must be prorated based on square footage of the entire
house. 61 For example, if a home office only represents 10 percent of the
area of the entire home, the IC typically can depreciate only 10 percent
of the house and deduct only 10 percent of the utilities and insurance.
Regarding health insurance, historically an IC could deduct 25 percent
of the premiums as an above-the-line deduction 62 while an Employee
must treat 100 percent of such premiums as below-the-line deductions.6 3
However, most Employees are entitled to exclude the entire amount of
Employer-provided health insurance premiums as a tax-favored fringe
benefit.' Moreover, many observers believe that ICs are far less likely to
maintain health insurance plans than Employers.65
Regarding the interest deduction, the IC can deduct business interest 66
55. See supra notes 38 - 53 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 20 - 31 and accompanying text.
57. Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 609.
58. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(2)(A),-(c) (1992).
59. I.R.C. § 62(c) generally describes an "accountable plan."
60. Even if an IC uses her home office as her "principal place of business," she must also use
the office "regularly and on an exclusive" basis for business. Consequently, even a de minimis "per-
sonal" use of the home office will deny the deduction altogether. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1992).
Furthermore, virtually all observers believe that the new Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v.
Soliman, see note 45, will substantially reduce the availability of the home office deduction for ICs.
61. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980).
62. I.R.C. § 162(1) (1992).
63. See I.R.C. §§ 162(1), 213(d)(1)(C) (1992).
64. See supra notes 20 -31 and accompanying text.
65. Eg., Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 609.
66. I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(2)(A) (1992).
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while the Employee cannot.67 However, most true Employees do not
incur interest in their capacities as Employees. If a business expenditure
must be financed, it would be much more cost effective for the Employer
to finance the expenditure and provide the benefit to the Employee
frequently as a tax-free fringe benefit.68
Finally, with respect to employment-related taxes, since 1990 the com-
bined FICA rate on Employees is the same as the SECA rate on ICs. 69
Indeed, in many instances the Employee's FICA wage base is lower than
that of the IC after factoring in Employee's excluded fringe benefits.7°
Consequently, the social security tax system does not inherently favor
ICs over Employees. Thus, it should appear fairly clear that the struc-
tural tax rules do not in operation inherently favor ICs over Employees.
What then is driving the Service's aggressive effort to reclassify ICs as
Employees?
WHY THE SERVICE ADAMANTLY PURSUES RECLASSIFICATION
The Service is probably well aware that the substantive tax rules do
not inherently favor ICs over Employees. However, the Service is con-
vinced that, as a group, ICs report less of their actual gross income and
overstate more of their deductions than Employees.7 Is the Service
right? Of course it is. Virtually every practitioner knows intuitively (if
not actually) that ICs are more likely to violate the income tax reporting
rules than Employees.7 2  As one informed commentator concluded:
"Self-employed individuals are widely known for evasion of the income
tax, and tax administrators throughout the world have searched for ways
to induce the self-employed to comply with their tax obligations."73 The
reason is quite simple. An Employee's gross income and taxes are re-
ported and withheld at the source. Accordingly, it is extremely difficult
for an Employee to understate compensation and/or fail to pay her taxes.
By contrast, an IC has no taxes withheld at the source. Also, an IC
67. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1992).
68. See supra notes 20 - 31 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 35.
70. For example, certain contributions to pension and health insurance plans are generally ex-
cluded from the Employee's FICA wage base, but are not deductible from the IC's SECA wage base.
Compare I.R.C. §§ 1402 with 3121(a)(5) (1992). See also, Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 609.
71. The IRS has reported that over 60 percent of all non-filing taxpayers were self-employed
people who dealt in cash, or were wage earners who had little tax withheld from their wages. IRS
Aims Initiatives at Nonfilers, TNT, Sept. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
72. As one commentator concluded: "In recent years, compliance studies have confirmed what
we have long inferred from the regular pleas of so many of our vendors for cash - that the self-
employed are woefully deficient in reporting their income, that Horatio Alger has a foot of clay."
Dan Subotnik, Equity For The Compliers. On Eliminating - OR Extending - The Two-Percent Rule,
56 TAX NOTES 809, 810 (1992).
73. Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and Anal-
ysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 108 (1990).
1992]
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typically has little incentive to notify the IRS if the Service Recipient fails
to file its Form 1099. 74 By contrast, an Employee typically will notify
either his Employer or the Service if he fails to get his Form W-2, other-
wise the Employee might not get credit for his withheld taxes. More-
over, the 2 percent limitation under Section 67 substantially reduces the
ability of most Employees to overstate questionable miscellaneous busi-
ness deductions. Of course, the 2 percent rule does not apply to ICs.
Based on a 1984 study, the Service estimates that at least $1.6 billion in
tax revenues are lost annually due to noncompliance by misclassified
ICs. 75 Based on a 1989 General Accounting Office study, the Service
estimates that 38 percent of Service Recipients have misclassified Em-
ployees as ICs. 76 Moreover, the Service estimates that there are now at
least 3.4 million misclassified workers. 77 Consequently, the Service's po-
sition is quite simple - the more it encourages (or requires) Service Re-
cipients to classify workers as Employees, the more likely the workers
will pay their fair share of taxes. In the abstract this is not a bad policy.
However, as discussed later, the rules for applying this policy are fre-
quently unfair and often prove to be unworkable.
One should also note that some commentators believe that the Service
pursues reclassification, in part, to generate penalty and interest revenues
for the Government.78 However, this author believes that a desire for
penalty revenue does not drive the Service's efforts to reclassify. 79 This
author also believes that if a worker classification system was imple-
mented ensuring comparable tax reporting compliance between Employ-
ees and ICs, the Service would quickly retreat from its aggressive
reclassification position.
Observation
In order to curb perceived rampant noncompliance, the Service is cre-
ating a tax environment that makes Service Recipients afraid to classify
workers as ICs. The Service creates this fear by threatening to reclassify
workers from IC status to Employee status on a large scale basis. A
successful reclassification can create a significant (and possibly over-
74. It is commonly perceived that many (if not most) ICs report their gross income based on
the amounts reported on their Forms 1099. If an IC fails to receive a Form 1099 for moneys re-
ceived, there is little immediate economic incentive to report the earnings since no taxes were
withheld.
75. See Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 607.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 610 (where the author states: "Penalties by their nature, should not be a separate
means to raise revenue, but rather a method by which the underlying, substantive tax laws to raise
revenue are enforced.").
79. My conclusion is based primarily on private conversations with various officials with the
Internal Revenue Service.
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whelming) obligation for the parties involved."° The reclassification gen-
erates not only direct taxes, penalties, and interest, but also ripple effect
costs. For example, the reclassification may cause the Service Recipient
to violate an array of nondiscrimination rules that permeate the tax
system.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF WORKER RECLASSIFICATION
When an IC is reclassified as an Employee, the Employer becomes lia-
ble for all or a portion of the income and FICA taxes that should have
been withheld. In addition, the Employer is then liable for the Em-
ployer's portion of the FICA and FUTA taxes.81 Moreover, a long laun-
dry list of tax penalties (and interest) may be imposed.
For example, an Employer hit with a reclassified Employee may be
subject to the following retroactive penalties: failure to file Forms 940
and 941,2 failure to timely pay withheld income or employment taxes,
83
failure to timely deposit certain taxes,84 and failure to file necessary infor-
mation returns with the IRS on the worker-payee.85 Additionally, when
a Service Recipient is determined to have willfully neglected to file a re-
turn, or fraudulently failed to file a return, penalties may be substantially
increased.8 6
Moreover, the obligations for certain back taxes can reach beyond the
actual Employer and create personal liability for certain individuals
known as "responsible persons."8 7 This obligation is commonly referred
to as the "100-percent penalty." 8  The penalty arises because the Em-
ployer is required to withhold an Employee's income taxes and the Em-
ployee's portion of FICA taxes. These withheld taxes are subject to a
trust in favor of the Government and are aptly referred to as "trust fund"
taxes.89
The 100-percent penalty is based only on the trust fund portion of em-
ployment taxes (i.e., income tax withholding and Employee's portion of
FICA taxes). FUTA taxes and Employer's portion of FICA taxes can-
not be collected through this penalty. Moreover, the 100-percent penalty
is separate and distinct from the liability imposed upon the Employer for
the trust fund taxes. Consequently, a responsible person cannot require
80. See infra notes 81 - 109 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 18 - 19 and accompanying text.
82. I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1992).
83. I.R.C. § 6651(b) (1992).
84. I.R.C. § 6656(a) (1992).
85. I.R.C. §§ 6721 and 6722 (1992).
86. See I.R.C. §§ 6651(0(1) and 6721(e) (1992).
87. I.R.C. § 6672 (1992).
88. Id.
89. I.R.C. § 7501 (1992).
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the Service to pursue collection from the Employer first.'
A responsible person is personally liable for the 100-percent penalty
and the penalty is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.9" A responsible per-
son is generally any person who "willfully" fails to collect or pay over the
trust fund taxes, or who "willfully" attempts to defeat the payment of
such taxes.92 The Code defines a "person" (who may be "responsible") as
including an officer or Employee of a corporation, 93 or a member or Em-
ployee of a partnership. 94 A person is liable for the 100-percent penalty
if he has the "responsibility and duty" to pay over the trust fund taxes.9"
Whether a person is "responsible" is generally based on a facts and cir-
cumstance test. However, an individual will generally be considered a
responsible person if she was in a position to direct which of the Em-
ployer's expenses will be paid.96
In addition to employment tax penalties, worker reclassification can
unexpectedly (and retroactively) eliminate tax benefits previously granted
to the Service Recipient and to the worker. As noted earlier, 97 an IC
reclassified as an Employee can cause the Employer to have retroactively
violated a legion of fringe benefit nondiscrimination rules applying to:
qualified retirement plans, group term life insurance, self-insured medical
reimbursement plans, COBRA requirements, group legal services, depen-
dent care programs, educational assistance programs, no additional cost
fringe benefits, qualified employee discount fringe benefits, and cafeteria
plans. Furthermore, the courts have held that an IC who is reclassified
as an Employee may bring suit to recover damages for not receiving ben-
efits under the Employer's retirement plan.98
Employee reclassification can also create additional taxes, interest, and
penalties for S Corporations that use stockholders as workers. As most
students of the tax system know, an S Corporation's taxable income gen-
erally bypasses corporate taxation, 99 passes directly through to the stock-
90. See Peterson v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 624 (D. Idaho 1989); Turchon v. United States,
77 B.R. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, In re Turchon, 841 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1988).
91. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1); 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(7)(C) (1992).
92. I.R.C. § 6672 (1992); Rev. Rul. 54-158, 1954-1 C.B. 247.
93. I.R.C. § 6671(b) (1992).
94. Id.
95. In Anderson v. United States, 561 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1977), an accounting firm that over-
saw the finances of an employer was deemed a responsible person for purposes of the 100-percent
penalty.
96. Id.
97. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
98. Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Short v. Central States Pension Fund,
729 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has recently held that the "common law" test for
determining employee status applies for purposes of determining a worker's rights to retirement
benefits under ERISA. This decision reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that would have defined
Employee much more liberally for ERISA purposes. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S.Ct.
294 (1992).
99. See I.R.C § 1363(a) (1992).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1992], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol20/iss2/2
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR TAX RULES
holder(s),' " and is taxed exclusively on the stockholder's individual tax
return.' 0 ' Corporate dividends to an S Corporation's stockholders are
generally income tax free10 2 and are not subject to withholding, FICA,
or FUTA taxes.' 03 Consequently, closely-held S Corporations tend to
pay a stockholder/worker dividends instead of compensation to avoid
the employment-related taxes. However, an S Corporation that primar-
ily or exclusively distributes dividends to a stockholder who is reclassi-
fied as an Employee-will be subject to withholding, FICA, and FUTA
taxes as well as penalties and interest."°
Finally, an IC who is reclassified as an Employee could theoretically
lose (or have reduced) the following deductions: contributions to the re-
classified IC's own retirement plan, businesses expenses unreimbursed
under an "accountable plan," certain home office deductions (and related
travel expenses), 25 percent of the cost of health insurance premiums,
and trade or business interest with respect to the worker's "employment"
status.'0" In addition, the loss or reduction of these deductions may
serve to further scale back the worker's itemized deductions and personal
exemptions. 106
Observation
Based on the foregoing, it should be clear to any reasonably informed
taxpayer that the costs (in taxes, penalties, and interest) of a reclassified
worker(s) can be devastating and far reaching. Indeed, some suggest that
such penalties could push a cash-strapped business into bankruptcy.
10 7
Consequently, the mere existence of such substantial reclassification pen-
alties places enormous power in the hands of the Service. The Service's
power is magnified by the fact that there are few if any definitive stan-
dards for determining proper worker classification. The worker classifi-
cation rules are a maze of complex and occasionally inconsistent rules
found in a patchwork of Internal Revenue Code provisions, Tax Acts
(not found in the Code), Treasury Regulations, cases, rulings, and ad-
ministrative pronouncements. 0 8 Ultimately, the rules rely heavily on
100. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1992).
101. I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366(a) (1992).
102. Under I.R.C. § 1368(b), distributions by an S Corporation to its stockholders are generally
tax free to the extent of the stockholder's basis in his stock.
103. For SECA tax purposes, dividends are expressly excluded from the definition of "net self-
employment income." I.R.C. § 1402(a),(b) (1992).
104. E.g., Radtke v. United States, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v.
United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287.
105. See supra notes 33 - 52 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., Charles Davenport, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Employment Tax Panel Reviews Relief
Measures, 56 TAX NOTES 841, 842 (1992); Rita L. Zeidner, Industries Testify For and Against
Tighter Employment Status Controls, 56 TAX NoTEs 405 (1992).
108. See infra notes 110 - 144 and accompanying text.
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"facts and circumstances"'" - an inherently messy standard. Such a
standard (combined with enormous penalties) allows the Service to strike
fear in the hearts of most Service Recipients. The Service's aggressive
audit policy has indeed created an environment of fear for most informed
Service Recipients. The only way to eliminate this fear is for taxpayers to
simply treat all workers as Employees from the outset, which is precisely
what the Service wants.
SUMMARY OF WORKER CLASSIFICATION RULES
To the weak-hearted, the worker classification rules may appear over-
whelming. Borrowing a quote from a well-known tax commentator, the
worker classification rules could be aptly described as "a creation of pro-
digious complexity ... essentially impenetrable to all but those with the
time, talent, and determination to become a thoroughly prepared expert
on the subject."'1 0
When evaluating the classification rules, one should keep one overrid-
ing concept in mind: the rules are based primarily on employer-employee
common law rules. t"' Consequently, the common law rules constitute
the "general rules," and any other rules (statutory or otherwise) repre-
sent exceptions or modifications to the general rules. To be sure, Con-
gress has infiltrated the common law general rules with a series of
statutory special rules, safe harbors, and presumptions.
General Rule (The Common Law "Control" Test)
The Treasury Regulations generally provide that a worker is deemed
an Employee for tax purposes if the Service Recipient "has the right to
control" and direct the worker, not only as to result but also as to the
details and means by which the result is accomplished."I2 This so-called
control test is essentially a codification of the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior applicable to tort actions."t 3 In applying the control
test, courts typically look to the "substance" of the relationship rather
than the "form.""' 4 Furthermore, the control test focuses primarily on
109. See infra notes 111 - 124 and accompanying text.
110. Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 547 (1986). Professor Lokken
used this statement to describe the horribly complex regulations under I.R.C. § 704(b). However,
this quote is equally applicable to the worker classification rules.
111. See I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1992) (making common law rules determining worker status appli-
cable for FICA tax purpose). See also I.R.C. § 3306(i) (1992) (making common law rules applicable
for FUTA tax purposes). Although I.R.C. § 3401 does not expressly apply the common law rules
for income tax withholding purposes, courts typically do apply the rules for withholding purposes.
E.g., Lanigan Storage & Van Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1968).
112. See Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-i (1986) (FICA), 31.3306(i)-i (1986) (FUTA), and
31.3401(c)-1 (1986) (income tax withholding).
113. Lifetime Siding, Inc. v. United States, 359 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1966).
114. See, e.g., Illinois Tri-Seal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 216 (1965).
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the Service Recipient's control over the details and means by which work
is performed, not control over the end results. 15 Moreover, the Treas-
ury Regulations make it clear that Employee status is not based on the
actual exercise of control. Instead, it is sufficient that the alleged Em-
ployer has the "right to control," whether or not the right is actually
exercised. 116
In determining whether a Service Recipient has the requisite control
over a worker, the courts have relied on a large (and cumbersome) laun-
dry list of factors. Some commentators have observed that courts may,
in the aggregate, consider up to fifty factors.' 1 7 However, the Service has
ruled that it will focus primarily on twenty factors." 8 Today, many
practitioners use these twenty factors as a checklist for avoiding Em-
ployee status.
It is beyond the scope of this article to review each of the twenty fac-
tors in detail. However, the following is a brief survey of these factors: 19
(1) Instructions. The Service Recipient's right to instruct the worker on
"how" the work is to be performed supports Employee status.
(2) Training. Ongoing and organized training programs for workers
imply Employee status.
(3) Integration. A Service Recipient should make sure that the Worker
does not integrate his operations with that of the Service Recipient
in order to support IC status.
(4) Services Rendered Personally. IC status is further supported if the
worker is not required to render the services personally.
(5) Hiring and Supervision. ICs should control their own helpers and
such helpers should be Employees of the IC.
(6) Continuing Relationship. Even the appearance of a permanent
working relationship between the Worker and Service Recipient
suggests Employee status.
(7) Set Hours of Work ICs should have the authority to set their own
work schedules and that of their assistants and helpers.
(8) Full Time Required. If the Service Recipient requires the worker to
work fulltime (or a minimum number of hours or days), Employee
status is implied.
(9) Work On Employer's Premises. To help avoid Employee status, ICs
should not be given office space or work stations on the Service Re-
cipient's premises.
(10) Sequence of Work. ICs should establish their own timetables and
priorities, and should not be required to perform services in a par-
ticular sequence.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 550 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1977).
116. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (1986).
117. See Daniel L. Morgan and Yale F. Goldberg, Employees and Independent Contractors,
Tax Transactions Libr. (CCH), 221 (Apr. 1991).
118. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987 C.B. 296.
119. Id.
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(11) Reports. The IC should be responsible only to the ultimate cus-
tomer. The IC should never be required or encouraged to make
progress or final reports to the alleged Employer.
(12) Payment Terms. If possible, the IC should be paid by job, not by
the hour, week, or month.
(13) Business/Travel Expenses. If the Service Recipient pays for the
Worker's licenses, meals, or transportation expenses, Employee sta-
tus is implied. Such expenses should be covered in the IC's overall
contract price.
(14) Tools and Materials. The IC should be responsible for furnishing
his own tools and equipment (and for determining which tools he
needs).
(15) Significant Investment. The larger the IC's financial investment in
her own business enterprise (e.g., premises, inventories, supplies, ve-
hicles, and equipment), the more she looks like an independent busi-
ness person and less like an Employee.
(16) Realization of Profit Or Loss. The IC should operate in a fashion so
that he bears the ultimate risks for profit or loss from his business
enterprise. The ultimate customer should pay the IC directly and
the IC should carry his own liability insurance coverage.
(17) Multiple Customers. The IC should avoid working exclusively for
the alleged Employer. The IC should clearly establish that he offers
his services to outsiders.
(18) Offering Service to the Public. The IC should document that she
offers her services to the public generally by advertising, placing her
business name in the telephone directory, and using business cards.
(19) Right to Discharge. The alleged Employer should avoid retaining
the right to fire the IC at will (this indicates Employee status). In-
stead, the alleged Employer should merely avoid giving the IC fur
ther work if the alleged Employer is dissatisfied.
(20) Right to Terminate. Employees generally have the right to quit any-
time without incurring liability. By contrast, an IC contracts to
perform an agreed upon "result." The agreement should quantify
the measure of damages if the IC does not complete satisfactorily
the bargained for result.
The Service indicates that the above-listed factors should serve only as
guides, and not as rules of law.' 20 The degree of importance of each
factor depends on the worker's occupation and the context in which the
services are performed. In other words, the Service will weigh the twenty
factors on a case-by-case basis. According to some commentators, courts
tend to place greater emphasis on certain factors.12' Furthermore, courts
frequently consider control factors in addition to the Service's twenty
factors. 122 Finally, the Treasury Regulations generally provide that cer-
120. Id. at 298.
121. See Morgan and Goldberg, supra note 117, at 211.01.
122. Id. at 211.
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tain trades or professions are inherently independent such as: physicians,
lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, construction contractors, public stenog-
raphers, and auctioneers (provided they offer services to the public).' 23
Observation
Congress long ago recognized that the common law control test (based
on facts and circumstances) is fraught with uncertainty. Such a test
could unfairly cause reclassification to an unsuspecting or ill-advised tax-
payer. Consequently, Congress enacted Section 530 of the Revenue Act
of 1978124 (Section 530) creating a safe harbor from the harsh retroactive
recharacterization penalties under the common law test.
The Section 530 Safe Harbor
Initially, Congress intended Section 530 to be temporary. until Con-
gress could agree upon a set of rules more workable than the common
law test.1 25 However, Congress has yet to fashion an alternative test and
Section 530 remains in effect today, 126 even though it was never made
part of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 530 generally provides that a taxpayer who demonstrates a
"reasonable basis" for not treating a worker as an Employee is protected
against retroactive assessment of employment taxes.1 27 However, the
Service generally presumes that a taxpayer who seeks Section 530 relief
for.a worker automatically concedes that the Worker is otherwise an Em-
ployee.128  As discussed later, this presumption can create traps for un-
suspecting taxpayers.
Section 530 relief is available only if the Service Recipient has a "rea-
sonable basis" for treating a worker as an IC. A taxpayer can satisfy this
reasonable basis test only if he meets any one of three alternative tests.
The first test requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that he reasonably
relied on judicial precedent, a published IRS ruling, a technical advice
memorandum, or a private letter ruling pertaining to the taxpayer.
29
The second test requires the taxpayer to show that she has been subject
to a past IRS audit (whether or not an employment tax audit) which did
123. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-i, 31.3306(i)-I, and 31.3401(c)-I(c) (1986).
124. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, as amended by Act of Dec. 29,
1979, Pub. L. 96-167, 93 Stat. 1275, Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-541, reprinted
in, 1980-2 C.B. 596, The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat.
325, and Pub. L. 99-514, reprinted in, 1986-3 (Vol. 1) C.B. 1.
125. See Revenue Act of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 1978-3 C.B. 315, 507-08.
126. See The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 269(c), 96
Stat. 325.
127. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(1)(B), 92 Stat. 2763.
128. See Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518, at § 3.08. See also General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.
129. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(2)(A), 92 Stat. 2763.
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not result in the assessment of employment taxes based on misclassifica-
tion of workers holding substantially similar positions. 13  Finally, the
third test requires the taxpayer to establish that a significant segment of




Both the Service and Congress recognize that Section 530 is a very
powerful safe harbor, and many taxpayers could (and probably would)
abuse its use if it had no limitations. Consequently, the Service and Con-
gress have adopted positions that attempt to curb widespread abuse of
Section 530.
For example, the Service takes the position that the "industry prac-
tice" under the third test is determined on a nationwide basis.' 32 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has disagreed by concluding
that industry practice allows a taxpayer to look to the employment tax
practices of the taxpayer's industry in the taxpayer's immediate
vicinity. 133
Congress feared that taxpayers might attempt to switch existing Em-
ployees to ICs and later claim relief under Section 530. Consequently,
Section 530 provides that its relief is not available with respect to any
worker (or any other worker holding a "substantially similar position")
who was treated by the Service Recipient as an Employee for any tax
period.' As expected, the IRS rigidly applies this so-called consistency
rule against taxpayers. 135
In the early 1980s Congress became convinced that too many taxpay-
ers in the technical service industries were becoming overly aggressive in
using Section 530, creating unfair competition with respect to the more
responsible taxpayers. Consequently, as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986,136 Congress passed Section 1706137 adding new subsection (d) to
Act Section 530. Section 1706 now denies Section 530 relief to certain
technical service workers including engineers, designers, draftsmen, com-
puter programmers, systems analysts, or other similarly situated work-
ers. In other words, the above-listed technical service workers are
classified using only the common law control test - Section 530 relief is
wholly unavailable.
130. Id. at § 530(a)(2)(B). The Service has also held that the audit need not be an employment
tax audit. Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518.
131. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(2)(C), 92 Stat. 2763.
132. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8733004 (Apr. 23, 1987), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8749001 (Feb. 10, 1987).
133. General Inv. Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1987).
134. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 530(a)(3), 92 Stat. 2763.
135. The IRS has taken the position that Section 530 relief is unavailable if a Form 1099 was not
timely filed for the worker. Rev. Rul. 81-224, 1981-2 C.B. 197.
136. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
137. Id. at § 1706.
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In 1987, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 87-41 13 providing further
guidance on the application of Section 1706. For instance, the ruling
makes it clear that Section 1706 applies only to three-party "broker" ar-
rangements involving technical service workers. For example, Section
1706 would apply to a situation whereby a third-party broker arranged to
supply a computer programmer to a Service Recipient. However, Sec-
tion 1706 would apply only to the broker (i.e., the Service Recipient
could still assert a Section 530 defense). Moreover, if the Service Recipi-
ent contracted directly with the computer programmer (and no broker
was involved), Section 1706 would have no application and Section 530
relief would be available to the Service Recipient.
Observation
Section 530 (as amended by Section 1706) is fraught with uncertainties
and many of its undefined terms and phrases have created excessive liti-
gation. 139 Furthermore, Section 530 only applies relief from assessment
of employment taxes.' 4 Consequently, Section 530 can operate as an in-
sidious trap for unwary taxpayers who use it to avoid employment tax
assessments, and thus unexpectedly violate the fringe benefit non-dis-
crimination rules. This trap is exacerbated by the Service's position that
anyone seeking Section 530 relief is automatically conceding that the
worker is otherwise an Employee. 141
"Statutory" Employees and ICs
Congress has decided (or been persuaded by special interest groups)
that certain types of workers should automatically be treated as Employ-
ees or as ICs. Consequently, Congress has enacted statutes that, for em-
ployment tax purposes only, statutorily classify workers as either
Employees or ICs. For example, in 1982 Congress enacted section 3508
which treats the following workers as ICs: "qualified real estate agents"
(certain commissioned licensed real estate agents), and "direct sellers"
(certain commissioned workers who sell consumer products in their
homes). 142
By contrast, for certain employment tax purposes and if specified con-
ditions are met, the following workers are statutorily treated as Employ-
ees: corporate officers, certain commissioned truck drivers, certain full-
time life insurance salesmen, certain home workers, and certain traveling
138. 1987-1 C.B. 296.
139. See infra note 163.
140. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(1)(A), 92 Stat. 2763.
141. See supra note 128.
142. I.R.C. § 3508 (1992). This statute contains many special rules and technical prerequisites
that are beyond the scope of this article.
19921
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salesmen. 143 However, some of these so-called statutory employees can
still qualify as ICs for purposes of section 62 (above the line deductions)
and section 67 (miscellaneous itemized deductions)."
Observation
It is apparent that Congress sometimes feels that the worker classifica-
tion rules are too onerous, and at other times that they are too lenient.
For instance, the Section 530 safe harbor was enacted because the rules
were deemed too harsh, but Section 1706 was passed because the rules
were believed to be too lenient. Likewise, Congress has also wrestled
with whether the penalties that result from a reclassified worker are too
harsh or too lenient. To date, it appears that Congress believes that
worker reclassification penalties are generally too burdensome. Conse-
quently, Congress has enacted several statutes granting worker reclassifi-
cation "penalty" relief.
WORKER RECLASSIFICATION PENALTY RELIEF
In 1982, Congress enacted Section 3509 which does not affect whether
a worker is reclassified, but instead reduces the amount that would other-
wise be assessed against the Employer of a reclassified worker. 145 Section
3509 relief applies only to income tax withholding and the Employee's
share of FICA taxes.' 46 It does not apply to FUTA taxes, the Employer's
portion of FICA taxes, or interest and penalties. Moreover, Section 3509
is not available at all to certain statutory Employees if the Service Recipi-
ent intentionally disregarded the worker reclassification rules, or if the
Employer deducted income withholding tax but did not deduct FICA
taxes. 147
Section 3509 is mandatory when it applies.4' If the Employer prop-
erly and timely filed Form 1099 for the reclassified worker, the Section
3509 assessment is: 20 percent of the reclassified Employee's share of
FICA tax that should have been withheld, and 1.5 percent of the Em-
ployee's wages paid for income tax withholding liability.' 49 Further-
more, if the Employer did not properly and timely file the Form 1099,
the Section 3509 assessments listed above are doubled. 50
Like most rules in the worker reclassification area, section 3509 has
143. See I.R.C. §§ 3401(c), 3121(d)(1),(3) (1992). These statutes contain many special rules and
technical prerequisites that are beyond the scope of this article.
144. See Rev. Rul. 90-23, 1990-1 C.B. 28.
145. I.R.C. § 3509 (1992).
146. I.R.C. § 3509(a) (1992).
147. I.R.C. §§ 3509(c), (d)(2) (1992).
148. I.R.C. § 3509(a) (1992); Treas. Reg. § 31.3509-1(c)(ii) (1986).
149. I.R.C. § 3509(a) (1992).
150. I.R.C. § 3509(b) (1992).
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traps for the unsuspecting taxpayer. For example, an Employee gets no
reduction in his liability for income taxes and FICA taxes assessed
against the Employer under Section 3509.5 ' Furthermore, the Employer
cannot reduce his Section 3509 assessment by any income tax or FICA
tax actually paid by the Employee. 52
If section 3509 does not apply (e.g., the Worker is a statutory Em-
ployee; the Employer intentionally disregarded the applicable rules; or
the Employer deducted income tax withholding but did not deduct
FICA taxes), then the Employer may be allowed a tax reduction if the
reclassified workers paid their own taxes. For instance, Section 3402(d)
authorizes an Employer to credit against her proposed assessment any
income taxes paid by the worker. 53 Likewise, section 6521(a) authorizes
a similar credit for FICA taxes previously paid by the reclassified
worker.' 54 However, there are several limitations and restrictions to
these so-called "abatement" provisions which may limit their availability
to the Employer.
t55
WHY THE EXISTING RULES DON'T WORK
The worker classification rules fail at many levels. Ultimately, how-
ever, the rules fail because they are premised upon an unworkable and
impractical "facts and circumstances" test. This does not suggest that
facts and circumstances determinations are never appropriate in our tax
system. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to expect our tax system to
establish definitive and objective rules for all potential tax matters. As
expected, the tax system frequently and appropriately embraces a facts
and. circumstances approach to matters that are inherently fuzzy. For
example, the Supreme Court has long held that the deductibility of an
"ordinary and necessary" business expense will be determined on a case-
by-case basis.' 56 This makes sense because the term "ordinary and neces-
sary" (i) is not self defining, (ii) requires flexibility, and (iii) in the vast
majority of cases, expenses incurred by an operating trade or business
will be presumed ordinary and necessary. Therefore, such a test is
needed to accommodate rapidly changing business practices and would
only in fact be applied to a small minority of business expenditures.
By contrast, the worker classification issue potentially applies to every
151. See Rev. Rul. 86-111, 1986-1 C.B. 176.
152. I.R.C. § 3509 (d)(l)(B) (1992).
153. I.R.C. § 3402(d) (1992).
154. I.R.C. § 6521(a) (1992).
155. I.R.C. § 3402(d) generally provides that an employer's income tax withholding liability can
be abated only if it can adequately demonstrate that the worker reported and paid tax on the income.
The abatement does not eliminate employer liability for penalties or-additions to tax. See Treas.
Reg. § 31.3402(d)-i (1986).
156. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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worker in the United States. A tax system should not (and perhaps can-
not) tolerate a facts and circumstances determination on such a large
scale basis. This would be analogous to adopting a case-by-case determi-
nation of how business entities are to be taxed. Imagine a tax system that
would require owners of business entities to apply a facts and circum-
stances test in determining whether their entity would be taxed as a part-
nership,"' a C Corporation, 1" or an S Corporation."5 9  The business
community would not and should not tolerate such a system. It seems
clear that such a system is equally inappropriate with regard to worker
classification.
Furthermore, the facts and circumstances test that is presently being
applied to worker classification issues is particularly weak. For example,
the courts frequently state that they will look at the "substance" of a
worker relationship rather than the "form.""6 Thus, a Service Recipient
cannot rely on a written contract with a worker to ensure IC status if the
parties fail (intentionally or unintentionally) to follow its terms. By con-
trast, the Treasury Regulations make it clear that Employee status exists
if the Service Recipient merely has the "right to control" the worker,
whether or not the right is actually exercised.161
These rules effectively place the Service Recipient in a no win situa-
tion. If the Service Recipient has no contractual right to control the
worker but does so anyway, Employee status is found. If the Service
Recipient has a contractual right to control the worker but never does so,
Employee status is still found.
As stated previously, 62 Congress presumably recognizes that the com-
mon law control test is unwieldy, unpredictable, and frequently inequita-
ble. Consequently, it adopted the safe harbor provisions of Section 530
to provide a safe haven for unsuspecting taxpayers. However, Section
530 is at best a band-aid remedy to the problems surrounding the com-
mon law test. Section 530 creates its own uncertainty by adopting ill-
defined terms that have spawned litigation.163 Moreover, Section 530 is
at the same time too broad and too narrow. For instance, it is too nar-
row because it applies only to employment taxes and certain segments of
157. Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, sections 701 through 761, establishes
comprehensive rules for taxing partnerships.
158. Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, sections 301 through 385, establishes
comprehensive rules for taxing corporations that fail to be taxed under Subchapter S.
159. Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, sections 1361 through 1378, establishes
comprehensive rules for taxing S corporations that qualify and elect to do so.
160. E.g., Illinois Tri-Seal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 216 (1965).
161. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (1986).
162. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
163. See e.g.. General Inv. Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1987) (the court was
asked to determine whether "industry practice" meant "nationwide" or in the taxpayer's immediate
vicinity); American Institute of Family Relations v. United States, No. CV 72-1402 WMB, 1979 WL
1347 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1979) (dealing with definition of "reasonable basis").
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business. "This creates unnecessary tax traps relating to Employee
nondiscrimination rules, and horizontal tax inequity among similarly sit-
uated businesses. In contrast, Section 530 is too broad because of the
prior audit rule. The prior audit rule allows a Service Recipient to avoid
reclassification simply because an IRS agent failed to raise the issue on
audit.165 A similarly situated business that is audited by a more thor-
ough agent cannot use Section 530. Again, this creates unjustifiable hori-
zontal inequities between comparable businesses.
Finally, for many offending taxpayers, the penalties for reclassification
far outweigh the crime. It is inherently unfair to have a penalty structure
that can literally bankrupt a business when the penalty relates to a facts
and circumstances test. Penalties should be designed to encourage a tax-
payer's behavior that will improve compliance. However, as one com-
mentator states: "The problem with conforming taxpayer behavior
[under the current worker classification rules] is that, in many cases, the
taxpayer does not know what the proper behavior is." '66 In other words,
the harsh penalties for worker reclassification are frequently unfair when
applied to a taxpayer who reasonably believed that he satisfied the com-
mon law control test. Moreover, certain reclassification penalties are un-
known even to reasonably informed taxpayers and, therefore, cannot
encourage tax compliance. For example, in all likelihood, the fact that a
reclassified worker could violate various fringe benefit nondiscrimination
rules is frequently overlooked by taxpayers.
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROPOSALS
In response to the Service's intensified audit efforts, there has been a
recent flurry of proposals for improving the worker classification rules.
The proposals have come from Congressmen, bar associations, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Congressional sub-
committees, and various business groups. Although there seems to be a
consensus that the worker classification rules desperately need improve-
ment, there is little consensus as to exactly how the rules should work.
The proposals do, however, fall into four major categories: (i) a revision
of Section 530 to curb perceived abuses and inequities, (ii) tax amnesty
plans allowing Service Recipients to voluntarily reclassify workers with-
out penalty, (iii) more objective worker classification safe harbor rules,
and (iv) measures to improve reporting compliance by Service Recipients
and ICs. A more detailed review of each of these categories is helpful.
164. See supra notes 127 - 141 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
166. Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 610.
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Proposed Section 530 Revisions
Section 530 allows a taxpayer to avoid worker reclassification if he can
demonstrate a "reasonable basis for not treating a worker as an Em-
ployee." As discussed previously, 167 a Service Recipient can satisfy the
reasonable basis test only if he can demonstrate that: he reasonably relied
on certain authoritive precedents, a significant segment of his industry
has historically treated that type of worker as an IC, or he has been sub-
ject to a past IRS audit which did not result in the assessment of employ-
ment taxes (prior audit rule).
Many believe that the prior audit rule should be eliminated because it
creates inequities between comparable taxpayers. It is commonly as-
sumed that our tax system should strive to promote and preserve hori-
zontal tax equity. That is, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed
under the same rules unless persuasive reasons suggest otherwise. The
prior audit rule dilutes horizontal tax equity because it grants a taxpayer
more favorable tax treatment (in perpetuity) simply because an examin-
ing agent failed to recognize that the taxpayer was misclassifying its
workers. Such a broad safe harbor based on fortuitous circumstances
erodes taxpayer confidence in the tax system, and can create unfair com-
petitive advantages in the business world. Consequently, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants recommends that the prior au-
dit rules apply only if the prior audit raised the worker status issue on
substantially similar facts. t68 Furthermore, several Congressmen' 69 have
proposed that the prior audit rule be repealed altogether.
Tax Amnesty Plans
Few would disagree that the penalties for worker reclassification can
be (and many times are) extremely harsh. Excessive penalties can occur
even where the taxpayer honestly believed that she satisfied the common
law control test. Such a harsh penalty structure inhibits a taxpayer from
voluntarily reclassifying an IC as an Employee even though the taxpayer
knows that the worker is misclassified. Consequently, several proposals
recommend a tax amnesty plan allowing taxpayers to voluntarily reclas-
sify ICs as Employees without penalty. One proposal would allow for
only a two-year amnesty, 170 while another proposes an indefinite am-
167. See supra notes 124 - 141 and accompanying text.
168. Hearing on Independent Contractors Before the Committee on Small Business of the
United States House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (July 30, 1991) (Statement of the Tax
Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) (July 30, 1991) [hereinafter
AICPA Statement]. This statement was reprinted as part of seminar materials presented at the May
1992 American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting entitled "Resurgence of the Employee-
Independent Contractor Controversy."
169. See H.R. 3813, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. T. Lantos, D-CA).
170. See H.R. 3109, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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nesty. 7' One proposal operates as a tax amnesty by recommending that
all worker reclassifications be prospective only. 17 2 Some of the amnesty
proposals require a taxpayer to demonstrate that either it misclassified
workers based on a good faith misunderstanding of the rules, or it prop-
erly filed all tax forms regarding the misclassified worker."7 3 A primary
objective of these amnesty proposals is to encourage more misclassified
ICs to come back into the tax system which, in turn, will improve tax
compliance for large numbers of taxpayers.
Worker Classification Safe Harbors
Many believe that the current worker classification rules need to be
more objective and predictable. To this end, several groups and com-
mentators have proposed new safe harbor classification rules which, if
satisfied, would guarantee that a worker would not be re-classified. For
example, instead of using the current 20-factor test, one proposal would
look only at the following six factors to determine Employee status: 174
(1) The Service Recipient and worker mutually agree that the worker is
not an Employee.
(2) The businesses of the Service Recipient and the worker are managedindependently.
(3) The worker's principal place of business is not located at the Service
Recipient's facilities.
(4) The worker offers similar services to the general public or employs
other workers.
(5) The worker risks significant fluctuations in income.
(6) The worker provides services under a written agreement containing
specified provisions that support IC status.
If the Service Recipient satisfies each of these factors, IC status would
be guaranteed. Otherwise, she would have to rely on the common law
control test.
One enterprising proposal suggests that all workers should be classified
as Employees for withholding tax purposes unless the worker meets
either of two ironclad safe harbors. The first safe harbor would allow
nonemployee status if the worker certified that his service trade or busi-
ness expenses exceed 20 percent of the worker's net income from such
171. See H.R. 5011, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Reps. D. Barnard, D-GA, E.
Jenkins, D-GA, and M. Sisiskey, D-VA [herinafter H.R. 5011]; H.R. 3813, 102d-Cong., 1st Sess.
(199.1).
172. Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 610; AICPA Statement, supra note 168, at 125 (proposing
prospective reclassification only if Forms 1099 were properly filed and there was no evidence of
fraud).
173. E.g., Johnson and Rose, supra note 8, at 827 (this proposal recommends a retroactive am-
nesty provided certain conditions were met); H.R. 4216, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by
Rep. T. Lantos, D-CA).
174. AICPA Statement, supra note 168, at 124.
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services. 175 The theory here is that forcing withholding on a worker with
high business expenses would cause undue cash flow problems to the
worker because of over-withholding of taxes. The second safe harbor
would ensure IC status if the worker failed to work for the Service Recip-
ient a minimum number of days in the previous quarter.1 76 These two
objective tests would replace the common law factors presently used to
classify workers.
Improve Reporting Compliance
Many believe that the primary problem with the current worker classi-
fication rules is that too many ICs are under-reporting gross income.
Reasons for this noncompliance include: taxpayer ignorance of complex
rules, too many Service Recipients failing to file Forms 1099 for their
workers, and the Service's failure to aggressively match the filed Forms
1099 with the IC's tax return. Consequently, groups and commentators
have proposed that the Service and tax practitioners strive to educate the
business community regarding worker classification rules and responsi-
bilities through seminars, newsletters, etc. 177 Others have recommended
that more Service Recipients be required to file Forms 1099, and the fail-
ure to file penalties be increased (particularly if the worker is shown to
have underpaid his taxes).1 7' Finally, several commentators have urged
the Service to implement a program that will aggressively match the
Form 1099 information with the information filed on the IC's tax
return. 179
FINAL OBSERVATION AND SUGGESTIONS
It is relatively clear that there is no single best solution to the worker
classification dilemma. Whatever solution Congress adopts will inevita-
bly be a compromise. The number of different proposals illustrates that
there are at least three competing interests. The Service is primarily in-
terested in taxpayer reporting compliance and raising tax revenue. Tax-
payers yearn for horizontal equity and reduced administrative costs. Tax
advisors seek more predictability and consistency in the worker classifi-
cation rules. Consequently, there is no real consensus as to how the rules
should work. Indeed, there is little consensus even within the business
community on what the definition of an IC should be. As one commen-
tator put it: "The business community has historically failed to reach
175. Johnson and Rose, supra note 8, at 822.
176. Id.
177. AICPA Statement, supra note 168, at 126-127.
178. See Mastromarco, supra note 1; AICPA Statement, supra note 168, at 127; H.R. 5011
(which would lower the threshold for reporting payments to ICs from $600 to $100, and would
dramatically increase the penalties for failing to file Forms 1099).
179. Mastromarco, supra note 1, at 609-10.
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agreement among its members as to an appropriate definition for in-
dependent contractor status."' 8 0
Consequently, it would be presumptuous for this article or any article
to propose a "best" set of rules that should be applied to worker classifi-
cations. Instead, Congress is urged to develop its own compromise pull-
ing from the many proposals that have been offered. However, in
establishing its new worker classification rules, there are certain guide-
lines and principles that Congress should address.
There is little disagreement that Congress should reject the current
common law facts and circumstances test as its primary test. Instead,
worker classification should rely on the fewest and the most objective
standards possible. A more objective approach not only improves com-
pliance but fosters the perception that similarly situated taxpayers are
being taxed comparably.
Congress should also reduce the tax incentives that appear to favor ICs
over Employees. So long as the substantive tax rules appear to favor ICs,
workers will strive to manipulate whatever rules exist to achieve IC sta-
tus. Consequently, Congress should seriously consider whether the dif-
fering treatment of miscellaneous itemized deductions, trade or business
interest, and home office deductions are justified. At least one commen-
tator has suggested that the differing tax treatment should be eliminated
in order to promote horizontal tax equity.18 1
The rules should not be so onerous and rigid as to discourage tempo-
rary employment. An overly broad definition of Employee stifles busi-
ness opportunities for true entrepreneurs, discourages hiring of new
workers, and encourages Employers to squeeze more work out of its ex-
isting Employees. Congress should recognize that ICs are a vital part of
the U.S. economy and the worker classification rules should not be
skewed in a manner that will unduly hamper opportunities for ICs.
However the term Employee is ultimately defined, the same definition
should be used for all tax purposes. It would be unworkable to have one
definition of Employee for tax withholding purposes and another defini-
tion for retirement, accident, and health and other fringe benefit plans.
Congress should not attempt to define Employee only for tax withhold-
ing purposes as some proposals seem to do.
The rules should promote horizontal tax equity. To this end, there
should be no safe harbor provisions that benefit only certain segments of
business as is currently the case under Section 530. A tax environment
where taxpayers believe that they are being treated equitably with other
comparable taxpayers will encourage taxpayer compliance. Safe harbors
180. Id. at 602.
181. Subotnik, supra note 72.
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that are established should be based on objective standards and should
not create competitive advantages between comparable industries.
Congress should not base its rules on the erroneous assumption that
the "substantive" tax rules inherently favor ICs over Employees. Instead,
Congress should recognize that the present "reporting" rules inherently
favor ICs over Employees. Consequently, the focus should not be on how
to force a large number of ICs into Employee status. Instead, the focus
should be how to improve the present reporting rules to ensure that ICs
have comparable compliance rates with Employees.
Finally, Congress needs to encourage businesses with misclassified
workers to voluntarily reclassify the workers as Employees. An easy and
direct way to accomplish this is to provide taxpayers with a tax amnesty
for voluntary conversion.
In conclusion, revision of the worker classification rules is long over-
due. Congress has ample proposals from which to choose. It is time for
Congress to agree upon a workable and informed compromise and go
with it.
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